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This is the text of a lecture delivered by James C. Hathaway in London in October 2006 to mark
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of Jesuit Refugee Service. The lecture was sponsored jointly
by the Centre for the Study of Human Rights, London School of Economics;
the Heythrop Institute for Religion, Ethics, and Public Life; and Jesuit Refugee Service (UK).

Refugee Solutions,
or Solutions to Refugeehood?
James C. Hathaway
preserve state interests. This is not only a description of the
ground reality, but may in fact be a source of strength:
refugee law persists in large measure because governments
have a self-interest in its retention. And more specifically, is
it really such a bad thing, in a world in which sovereign
power still matters, to commit ourselves to enabling refugees
– that is, persons disfranchised from their own state – somehow to secure either a new national attachment, or be restored to that with their country of origin? In practical terms,
is that not a critical means of restoring dignity and self-determination?
Yet as I reflected more on Dr. Johns’s argument, I recognized that much of her charge is sound if directed not at
international refugee law as authentically conceived, but
rather at the distortion of refugee law that has emerged from
recent interstate and, in particular, agency reinterpretations
of refugee law.
The argument I wish to make is that a legal regime which
is in truth fundamentally oriented to the promotion of
autonomy of refugees has been “pathologized” to focus
instead on finding cures to refugeehood. A regime which
was actually established to guarantee refugees lives in dignity until and unless either the cause of their flight is firmly
eradicated or the refugee himself or herself chooses to pursue
some alternative solution to their disfranchisement has
now become a regime which labours nearly single-mindedly to design and implement top-down solutions which
“fix the refugee problem.”
In short, we increasingly see a regime oriented not to the
facilitation of “refugee solutions,” but instead to the implementation of “solutions to refugeehood.”

Writing in the International Journal of Law and Psychiatry,
Fleur Johns recently indicted international refugee law – the
ostensible source of refugee rights and solutions – as being
instead “a producer of... pathology.” She writes:
The Refugee Convention classifies refugees as “problem[s]” and
“cause[s] of tension” and works towards resolving these “problem[s]” and “tension[s].”.. Yet where... lies the “problem” to be
cured by recourse to international refugee law and lawyers?
Does it reside in the wars, famines and political conflicts that...
drive people from their countries of nationality? Does it reside
in the trauma of border-transgressions to which refugees are
subject...? Does it reside in the callousness of governments and
judges, or the xenophobia of the constituencies that support
them? [Or] [d]oes it rest as much... with international refugee
law’s tendency to insist upon the normality of stable and enduring national attachments; [and] its innate preference for limited, fear-laden divergences therefrom?1

There is an urgent need, Dr. Johns contends, for “... international refugee lawyers... [to] take a moment to question
the pre-eminence of the therapeutic mode in their professional work and its role in sustaining a prescriptive normality that tends to diagnose the refugee as flawed and requiring
correction...”2 She concludes,
Might our instruments and strategies of cure be tainted by the
very drives against which we supposedly labor in the international refugee law field? Might insistence that international
refugee law has or should have therapeutic, corrective effects
comprise part of the problem towards which it ostensibly directs those curative efforts?3

The Fallacy of “Solutions”
My first instinct was to contest Dr. Johns’s charge. As part
of international law, created and managed by states, the
refugee law regime of necessity achieves humanitarian good
in the margins of a more fundamental commitment to

To begin, I wish to be clear that I am not opposed to the
notion of “solutions” as such. Solutions, at least for those
who want them, are of course good things. But refugee
protection, despite much rhetoric from the United Nations
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‘durable solutions’ to refugee problems, especially as refugees [may] have no idea as to how long they are likely to
stay in a particular country.”9 Rather than propelling refugees towards some means of ending their stay abroad, the
Refugee Convention emphasizes the right of refugees to
take the time they need to decide when and if they wish to
pursue a durable solution.
In some cases, refugees will choose not to pursue any
solution right away, but will prefer simply to establish a
reasonably normal life in the state party where they sought
protection. This is a valid alternative, which may not lawfully be interfered with by either governments or international agencies. Because refugee rights inhere as the result
of the individual’s predicament and consequent status –
rather than as a result of any formal process of status
adjudication – they provide refugees with a critical, selfexecuting arsenal of entitlements which may be invoked in
any of the state parties to the Refugee Convention. They
afford refugees a real measure of autonomy and security to
devise the solutions which they judge most suited to their
own circumstances and ambitions, and to vary those decisions over time.
Yet when the focus is on the pursuit of “solutions” rather
than on respect for refugee rights as such, the drive is
fundamentally to re-establish systemic homeostasis, which
means that any conflicting priorities of refugees themselves
are secondary, if relevant at all.
Nowhere can this risk be seen more clearly than in the
context of the so-called “voluntary repatriation” framework.

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since the mid1990s to the contrary,4 is not primarily about looking for
solutions. Refugee protection is instead fundamentally oriented to creating conditions of independence and dignity
which enable refugees themselves to decide how they wish to
cope with their predicaments. It is about ensuring autonomy, not about the pursuit of externally conceived “fixes.”
Increasingly, though, there is impatience with the duty
simply to honour the rights of persons who are Convention
refugees. The focus of much contemporary discourse is
instead on the importance of defining and pursuing socalled “durable solutions” to refugee flight.5 The main goal
of a refugee protection regime oriented towards “durable
solutions” is effectively to find a way to bring refugee status
to an end – whether by means of return to the country of
origin, resettlement elsewhere, or naturalization in the host
country.
Indeed, those who focus on achieving durable solutions
increasingly regard respect for refugee rights as little more
than a “second best” option, to be pursued only until a
durable solution can be implemented. UNHCR’s Executive
Committee, for example, has endorsed a conclusion “[r]ecognizing the need for Governments, UNHCR and the international community to continue to respond to the
asylum and assistance needs of refugees until durable solutions are found [emphasis added].”6 This position is in line
with the view once expressed by a senior official of the
UNHCR that
protection should be seen as a temporary holding arrangement
between the departure and return to the original community,
or as a bridge between one community and another. Legal
protection is the formal structure of that temporary holding
arrangement or bridge.7

“Voluntary Repatriation”
As we all know, there is strong support for regarding repatriation as the best solution to refugeehood. UNHCR’s Executive Committee, for example, has “not[ed] that [while]
voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement
are the traditional durable solutions for refugees, . . . voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, when feasible [emphasis added].”10 As the language of the Executive
Committee makes clear, support is not normally expressed
for “repatriation” as a solution to refugeehood, but rather
for “voluntary repatriation.”11 Which sounds nice, right?
Wrong.
On closer examination, the routine use of this “voluntary
repatriation” terminology can be seen to be problematic.
While anchored in the language of the UNHCR Statute,12
and hence logically taken into account in determining what
sorts of role the agency can take on,13 the rights of state
parties to the Refugee Convention are quite differently
conceived.14 The Convention allows governments to bring
refugee status to an end only when there has been either

Despite the technical accuracy of the view that protection
is a duty which inheres only for the duration of risk, that
duty may be inadvertently degraded by referring to it as
simply an “arrangement or bridge” rather than as a legitimate alternative to the pursuit of a “durable solution” to
refugee status. This very simple notion – that the recognition and honouring of refugee rights is itself a fully respectable, indeed often quite a desirable response to involuntary
migration – can too easily be eclipsed by the rush to locate
and implement so-called “durable solutions.”8
In contrast to this emphasis on the pursuit of durable
solutions, the Refugee Convention gives priority to allowing refugees to make their own decisions about how best to
respond to their predicament. As a non-governmental
commentator astutely observed, one of the strengths of the
refugee rights regime is that it eschews “the false notion of
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repatriation” even though the durability of stay required by
the “voluntary re-establishment” test has in no way been
met.
Even more seriously, governments in much of the political South erroneously assert the right to terminate refugee
status on the grounds that UNHCR is promoting the “voluntary repatriation” of a given refugee population – even
though the demanding criteria for cessation due to a fundamental change of circumstances could in no sense be
satisfied. One might have hoped that states relying on the
UNHCR “voluntary repatriation” standard would simply
inject a volition requirement into their examination of
whether refugee status can lawfully be withdrawn due to a
fundamental change of circumstances in the country of
origin. This “best of all worlds” option – the risk has clearly
gone away, and this refugee is willing to go home – has not
materialized. Instead, the pattern is for governments in
most of the less-developed world to take UNHCR involvement in a given repatriation effort – relying on its agencybased “voluntary repatriation” standard – as a sufficient
basis in and of itself for the termination of their own duty
to protect the refugees in question, with no real attention
being paid to the actual legal criteria for cessation of status
(much less to volition). These governments simply end
refugee status for groups of refugees based on the legally
irrelevant fact that UNHCR is facilitating that group’s voluntary repatriation.23
In each of these ways, then, the “voluntary repatriation”
language – which sounds positive, rights-regarding,
autonomy-affirming – is, in practice, being relied upon to
deny refugee rights.
Sometimes this superficial reliance on the fact of an
ongoing UNHCR “voluntary repatriation” effort is no
more than a completely disingenuous ploy to justify a
government’s involuntary repatriation initiatives. In an extreme case, the Tanzanian government invoked UNHCR
voluntary repatriation efforts as justification for its own
decision in December 1996 that “all Rwandese refugees in
Tanzania are expected to return home by 31 December
1996.”24 This announcement, said to have been “endorsed
and co-signed by the UNHCR,”25 resulted in the return of
more than 500,000 refugees within the month.26 Yet the
criteria for lawful cessation of refugee status could not
possibly have been met in the circumstances: fair trials were
only beginning in Rwanda, disappearances and deliberate
killings were continuing there, and there was no reason
whatever to believe that Rwanda could meet the basic needs
of the returning refugees.27
As bad as it is for governments disingenuously to invoke
UNHCR “voluntary repatriation” efforts as authority for
their own less-than-voluntary return initiatives, there is a

“voluntary re-establishment” (not repatriation) or when
there has been a “fundamental change of circumstances” in
the country of origin which justifies the cessation of refugee
status (not when UNHCR decides that the moment is right
to promote “voluntary repatriation”).
To be clear, there are only two relevant, Conventionbased means of bringing refugee status to an end.
On the one hand, it may be the case that a person who is
a refugee – that is, who continues to be objectively at risk
of being persecuted – nonetheless decides to go back to the
country where that risk exists. In so doing, the refugee is
simply exercising the right of every person to return to his
or her own country.15 Refugee status may come to an end
if – but only if – the voluntary return amounts to re-establishment in the country of origin.16 Re-establishment is not
the same as return or repatriation. Simply put, the refugee
who returns only loses his or her refugee status once a
durable, ongoing presence in the home country is established. Up to that point, she remains a refugee and is legally
entitled to go back to the asylum country and to resume
refugee protection there if things do not work out as hoped
in the country of origin.17
The alternative solution to refugeehood allows the government of a state party to terminate refugee status and
require the return of a former refugee to his or her country
of origin where there has been a “fundamental change of
circumstances”18 that is significant and substantively relevant; which change is enduring; and which results in the
practical and dependable delivery of “protection” in the
home country.19 If – and only if – these demanding criteria
are met, return need not be voluntary20 so long as it is
carried out in a rights-regarding way.21
Where do these notions of “voluntary re-establishment”
and “cessation due to a fundamental change of circumstances” tie in to UNHCR’s favoured notion of “voluntary
repatriation”? In principle, “voluntary repatriation” should
really just define a UNHCR-based support mechanism to
either of these Convention-based options. If a refugee
wants to go home with a view to re-establishing himself or
herself there, or if a government has validly terminated
refugee status based on a “fundamental change of circumstances” there, then UNHCR as an agency is empowered to
facilitate “voluntary repatriation” to the country of origin.22
In fact, particularly in the less developed world, “voluntary repatriation” has insinuated itself into the Conventionbased rights regime, and has in practice become something
of a substitute for either “voluntary re-establishment” or
for “cessation due to a fundamental change of circumstances.” In the result, refugees who choose to “test the
waters” by return to their country of origin find that they
are deemed to have lost their status by reason of “voluntary
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refugees that they could return to Rwanda. Some have
returned, but many remain,’ he said . . . Such people, he
said, were ‘not refugees anymore’ (emphasis added).”’35
By taking such a legally unfounded, aggressive stance –
not only effectively purporting to “determine” the issue of
cessation under the Refugee Convention (which is not a
UNHCR responsibility or prerogative) but to do so based
not on the Convention standards, but rather on the basis of
his agency’s policy predispositions – themselves often
rooted in political, economic, or other concerns36 – the
then-High Commissioner took the distortion of refugee law
by reference to agency standards to a new height. The
subordination of the real requirements of the Convention
– that is, whether there is a fundamental, substantively
relevant, enduring, and protection-delivering change of
circumstance in the country of origin – to UNHCR’s institutional preparedness to approve “voluntary repatriation”
– whatever that means, on a given day – is not lawful and
has proved extraordinarily dangerous on the ground.
To return to my overarching theme, the distortion of
true cessation criteria by states and the UNHCR is important not only for its own sake, but because it stands as a
shockingly clear example of how the current fixation with
finding “solutions to refugeehood” has in practice trumped
the commitment to honouring the rights of refugeees as
codified in the Convention. Repatriation – often not really
voluntary, often not really safe, often not really warranted
by international law – nonetheless delivers a “solution to
refugeehood.” It thus serves the political and economic
interests of host governments anxious to divest themselves
of protective responsibilities. The rush to repatriation also
serves the interests of the refugee agency itself, which is
increasingly prone to trumpet its own value to powerful
states not simply by reference to the quality of life it has
secured for refugees, but instead by pointing to its success
in bringing refugee status to an end.37
Compounding the problem, developed governments,
with the active participation of the UNHCR, are presently
engaged in efforts systematically to deem refugee status
unwarranted in the political North where it can in principle
be secured closer to home, i.e. in the political South. While
refugee law is not necessarily breached by initiatives of this
kind, legal standards are infringed if return is effected to
places where “solutions to refugeehood” are pursued at the
expense of refugee rights. And to be candid, one’s suspicions in this regard are aroused when the required quality
of protection in destination countries is described by reference to amorphous, legally unfounded phrases such as
“effective protection” – not “protection,” full stop. While
the meaning of “protection” in refugee law is fairly clear –
including, at a minimum, respect for the Refugee Conven-

second – and in my view more pernicious – dimension to
the problematic reliance on “voluntary repatriation” standards in lieu of true Convention cessation criteria. As the
“supporting role” played by UNHCR in the unlawful repatriation of Rwandans from Tanzania suggests, the risks
which flow from reliance on the “voluntary repatriation”
paradigm may not be simply the consequence of host state
manipulation. Reliance on the “voluntary repatriation” alternative to the real, Convention-based cessation standard
is also prevalent as the result of institutional over-reaching
by UNHCR itself.
UNHCR has now taken positions which suggest that
governments should be guided by its institutional decisions
about when to pursue repatriation in deciding when refugees should go home. Indeed, such deference is now said by
UNHCR to be part of the “responsibilities of the host
country.”28 Thus, in 2002 UNHCR announced that it had
received “assurances [from] the Tanzanian and Rwandan
governments that security in Rwanda had improved [emphasis added],”29 and sanctioned the voluntary repatriation
of the remaining 20,000 Rwandan refugees living in Tanzania.30 Yet even the spokesperson for a partner agency participating in the ensuing government-orchestrated
“voluntary” repatriation conceded that the repatriation actually conducted by Tanzania relied upon an “impetus” in
the form of “verbal pressure”31 – in particular, a firm yearend deadline for the refugees’ departure.32 In at least some
instances, officials implementing the program used brute
force to compel even long-term Rwandan residents to leave
the country.33
Indeed, against the backdrop of UNHCR calls for repatriation, even host governments firmly committed to protection may on occasion feel under pressure to acquiesce in
the agency’s repatriation plans. For example, Zambia raised
concerns about the risks posed by land mines for Angolan
refugees slated for repatriation by UNHCR, but was reportedly lobbied by UNHCR to acquiesce in the return. The
agency sought to reassure Zambia that even though many
areas were “heavily mined . . . ‘[w]ith the funding UNHCR
has received, we will be expanding our presence in those
areas of resettlement to ensure that people are reminded of
the threat of land mines. So the problem is addressed (emphasis added).”34
The UNHCR’s ambition effectively to determine the
issue of cessation for state parties – and to do so by reference
not to Article 1(C)(5) of the Refugee Convention, but
drawing on its agency-based “voluntary repatriation”
standard – can be seen even more clearly in the assertion by
the then-High Commissioner for Refugees during a visit to
Africa in April 2003 that “Rwanda is safe for refugees in
Tanzania and Uganda . . . ‘In Tanzania, we informed the

6

© James C. Hathaway, 2007. This open-access work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
License, which permits use, reproduction and distribution in any medium for non-commercial purposes, provided the original author(s)
are credited and the original publication in Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees is cited.

Refugee Solutions, or Solutions to Refugeehood?

tion’s definition and rights regime – the consistent official
preference for the more fungible “effective protection” label is presumably of some normative significance. In particular, does anyone seriously imagine that “effective
protection” would be deemed not to exist in a country
which effects repatriation with UNHCR blessing, albeit
premature or unwarranted based on the cessation criteria
of the Convention itself?
What, then, is the challenge for the refugee advocacy
community?
First, refugee advocates today need to learn the Refugee
Convention “cold,” and to understand its relationship to
international human rights law more generally. In an era in
which there is no more than selective ability and inclination
to combat human rights abuse abroad, and in which traditional human rights law affords few immediate and self-actuating sources of relief, refugee law stands out as the single
most effective, relatively autonomous remedy for those
who simply cannot safely remain in their own countries.
The surrogate protection of human rights required by refugee law is too valuable a tool not to be widely understood,
and conscientiously implemented.
Second and related, we must refuse to buy into the
propensity of states and the UNHCR to misinterpret the
Convention so as to give priority to the search for “solutions
to refugeehood” over “refugee solutions.” The goal of refugee law is not to pathologize refugeehood and hence singlemindedly to pursue means of “curing” that status. To the
contrary, refugee law exists precisely in order to ensure that
refugees enjoy true dignity and quality of life for as long as
it takes them to decide for themselves how best to cope, to
respond, and to rebuild their lives. That prerogative cannot
be traded away by governments, by the UNHCR, or by us.
Put simply, refugee rights are not negotiable.

5.

6.
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On the one hand, the reference to the duty to respect the
voluntary character of repatriation “in all cases” could be read
to limit the right of states to repatriate even a person who is no
longer a refugee by virtue of cessation of status. On the other
hand, the final clause more clearly stipulates that the requirement of voluntarism may in fact be invoked only by a person
who is a “refugee,” thereby excluding a (former) refugee whose
status has validly ceased. If read to apply only to (present)
refugees, then the OAU provision can not only be reconciled
to its own cessation clauses, but also applied in consonance
with art. 1(C)(4) of the Refugee Convention, which does require
voluntary re-establishment by a person otherwise entitled to
refugee status before the duty to protect him or her comes to
an end. See Hathaway, supra note at c. 7.2.
21. The limitations on lawful repatriation set by international
human rights law are discussed in Hathaway, ibid. at 944–952.
22. “The High Commissioner shall provide for the protection of
refugees falling under the competence of his Office by . . .
[a]ssisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation.” UNHCR Statute at art. 8(c). Beyond this
authority, UNHCR may engage in other repatriation activities
only with the authorization of the General Assembly of the
United Nations: UNHCR Statute, at art. 9. The Executive
Committee of UNHCR has recently gone beyond this constraint in a modest way, calling upon the agency to “tak[e] clear
public positions on the acceptability of return of persons
found not to be in need of international protection”: UNHCR
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23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

Executive Committee Conclusion No. 96, “Conclusion on the
Return of Persons Found Not to be in Need of International
Protection” (2003), at para. (j)(ii). The reference to persons
not in need of international protection refers, however, only
to persons not initially entitled to recognition of Convention
refugee status, rather than also to persons whose refugee status
has ceased.
“UNHCR has organized itself to facilitate repatriation . . . As
evidenced by its healthy and thoroughgoing debate over how
far it could venture toward repatriation without violating
refugee rights, UNHCR was no mere plaything in the hands
of states, but rather had the capacity for reasoned reflection
and exhibited some relative autonomy . . . But soon there
developed a repatriation culture that left refugees at greater
risk . . . [A] repatriation culture means that UNHCR is oriented around concepts, symbols, and discourse that elevates
the desirability of repatriation, coats it in ethical luster, and
makes it more likely that repatriation will occur under more
permissive conditions.” M. Barnett, “UNHCR and Involuntary Repatriation: Environmental Developments, the Repatriation Culture, and the Rohingya Refugees” (Paper
presented at the 41st Annual Convention of the International
Studies Association, Los Angeles, 14–18 March 2000), online:
<http://www.ciaonet.org/isa>.
Amnesty International, “Great Lakes Region: Still in Need of
Protection: Repatriation, Refoulement and the Safety of Refugees and the Internally Displaced,” Doc. No. AFR/02/07/97
(1997) [Amnesty International] at 2.
“On December 5, 1996 . . . UNHCR distributed information
sheets to refugees about the repatriation exercise, including the
immediate suspension of economic and agricultural activities
in the camps . . . During the repatriation exercise, UNHCR
provided both financial and logistical assistance to the Tanzanian government.” B. Whitaker, “Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania”
(Working Paper No. 53, New Issues in Refugee Research,
UNHCR, February 2002) at 1–2. UNHCR pronounced itself
satisfied that the returns were in fact voluntary despite solid
evidence to the contrary. See Amnesty International, supra
note 24 at 2; US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey
1997 (1997) at 99–100.
“Initially tens of thousands of refugees fled the [Tanzanian]
camps and attempted to move further into Tanzania, in the
hope of reaching neighbouring countries. The Tanzanian security forces intercepted the fleeing refugees and ‘redirected’
them towards the Rwandese border . . . Reports now indicate
that some refugees who refuse to go back are being arrested
and held in a detention camp . . . Other refugees who wished
to remain were undoubtedly forced back in the rush.” Amnesty International, supra note 24 at 2. Importantly, it was only
after the returns occurred that UNHCR “expressed hope that
Tanzania [would] institute a screening procedure to evaluate
the claims of individuals too fearful to return;” ibid.
Ibid. at 5–6.

28. UNHCR, “Voluntary Repatriation Handbook,” supra note 13
at 12. Specifically, UNHCR asserts that “[t]he country of
asylum should respect the leading role of UNHCR in promoting, facilitating and coordinating voluntary repatriation;” ibid.
29. It is noteworthy that at this time, the training of judges who
would preside over the trial of persons accused of all but the
highest category of genocide crimes had only been commenced. It was therefore not surprising that Rwandan refugees
continued to express grave reservations about the practical
efficacy of commitments to protect them from retaliation.
“Focus on Rwanda Refugees in Tanzania,” UN Integrated
Regional Information Networks, 9 May 2002.
30. “Rwandan Refugees to Be Out by December 31,” East African
(14 October 2002).
31. “Thousands more refugees seek repatriation,” UN Integrated
Regional Information Networks, 9 January 2002, quoting
Mark Wigley, deputy director of Norwegian People’s Aid. In
the context of a subsequent effort by Tanzania to repatriate
refugees to Burundi, a consortium of US-based non-governmental organizations called upon the Tanzanian government
to “cease placing political and psychological pressure” on the
refugees to return. “NGOs Concerned over Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees,” UN Integrated Regional Information
Networks, 15 May 2002.
32. “In late September 2002, UNHCR and the governments of
Tanzania and Rwanda convened a tripartite meeting in Geneva . . . to discuss durable solutions for refugees living in
Tanzania. The officials . . . found that, inter alia, ‘[p]ressure
exerted by the governments of Tanzania and Rwanda on
Rwandan refugees living in Tanzania and on UNHCR officials
in Tanzania and Rwanda played a significant role in unnecessarily hurrying the voluntary repatriation program.’“ J.
Frushone, “Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees Living in Tanzania,” US Committee for Refugees, 10 January 2003. Indeed,
“[n]ewspapers in Eastern Africa have reported that Tanzania
will forcibly send 2,000 Rwandan refugees living in the camps
in western Tanzania back to Rwanda. The 2,000 are those who
refused to return home during the recent voluntary repatriation, citing insecurity in their home country as the reason for
remaining . . . The feeling in the Tanzanian government is that
there is noneed for the refugees to remain because the security
situation in Rwanda is now stable. Earlier this month, Tanzania’s Home Affairs Minister, Mr. Omar Ramadhan Mapuri,
warned that Tanzania might be forced to repatriate all the
refugees living in the country if the international community
does not intervene in the serious food crisis facing the refugees.” (2003) 127 JRS Dispatches (28 February 2003).
33. “The President of the National Repatriation Commission . . .
[said] that the move by the Tanzanian government had caught
more than the evictees by surprise. ‘We had not anticipated this.
We asked them to stop the process for some time so that we can
talk with them and work out the modalities of how it should be
done’ . . . [Tanzanian ambassador to Rwanda] Mwakalindile
admits that the forced repatriation may not have been handled
appropriately.” “Forced to Go Home: Rwandan Immigrants in
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Tanzania,” Internews, 15 April 2003. “The last convoy [of
Rwandan refugees] to depart Tanzania carried refugees who
alleged that Tanzanian authorities threatened to burn down
their homes if they refused to leave the country. UNHCR
insisted, however, that ‘those repatriated were refugees who had
voluntarily signed up . . . to return home.’“ US Committee for
Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2003 (2003) at 100.
34. “UNHCR Addresses Returnee Concerns,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 14 March 2003, quoting
UNHCR regional spokesperson Fidelis Swai; see also “Zambia:
Plans for Return of Refugees Finalised,” Africa News, 17 March
2003, confirming UNHCR’s efforts to downplay Zambian
concerns regarding the safety and security of conditions for
return in Angola. In fact, even after UNHCR had announced
that the road linking Maheba refugee settlement in Zambia
with Cazombo in Angola was free of mines, “the return of
more than 400 Angolan refugees . . . was postponed due to the
discovery of a mine on June 10, two days before the beginning
of the planned repatriation.” “Angola: Preparations for the
Beginning of the Organised Repatriation of Refugees,” (2003)
135 JRS Dispatches (1 July 2003).
35. “Rwanda is safe for returning refugees, says UNHCR head,”
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 16 April 2003.
36. As Amnesty International noted in a stinging critique of
UNHCR’s decision to assist Tanzania’s December 1996 enforced repatriation of Rwandans, “[t]hat [protection] oversights were possible, were legitimized by UNHCR, and were
so readily accepted by the international community speaks
volumes. Does the world remain committed to protecting
refugees, or do we now emphasize return, for political and

Number 2

financial reasons, over safety?” Amnesty International, supra
note 24 at 3.
37. “By the end of 2005, the global number of refugees reached an
estimated 8.4 million persons, the lowest level since 1980. This
constitutes a net decrease of more than one million refugees
(–12%) since the beginning of 2005, when 9.5 million refugees
were recorded. This is the fifth consecutive year in which the
global refugee population has dropped and the second sharpest decrease since 2001. Over the five year period, the global
refugee population has fallen by one third (-31%). Decreases
in the refugee population are often the result of refugees
havingaccess to durable solutions, in particular voluntary repatriation... The past four years saw an almost unprecedented
level of voluntary repatriation, mainly due to the return of
more than 4.6 million Afghans from Pakistan and the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Globally, more than six million refugees were
able to return home during 2002–2005, of which 4.6 million
with UNHCR assistance.” UNHCR, 2005 Global Refugee
Trends (2006) at paras. 7, 19.
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